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In re Beer Institute, 849 F.2d 753 (1988)
57 USLW 2010

849 F.2d 753
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
In re The BEER INSTITUTE (formerly
named United States Brewers Association,
Inc.) as an association, and on behalf of its
following members selling beer in the State
of Connecticut and the bordering States of
Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island:
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Miller Brewing Company,
Latrobe Brewing Company, Pabst Brewing
Company, The Stroh Brewery Company.
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC.; G. Heileman Brewing
Company; the Genesee Brewing Company Inc.,
Miller Brewing Company; All Brand Importers,
Inc.; Dribeck Importers, Inc., Guiness-Harp
Corp.; Labatt Importers, Inc., Martlett Importing
Company, Inc.; Monterey Bay Company, Inc.; and
Van Munching Company, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
John F. HEALY and David L. Snyder,
as Commissioners of the Department
of Liquor Control; and Charles Kasmer,
as Secretary of the Department of
Liquor Control, Defendants-Appellees,
Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of Connecticut,
Inc., as an association, and on behalf of
its following members selling alcoholic
liquor in the State of Connecticut:
Johnny Barton, Inc.; the Brescome Distributors
Corporation; Connecticut Distributors, Inc.;
Eder Bros., Inc.; Gallo Wine Merchants Inc.;

Constitution. Trade association of wholesalers intervened.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, 669 F.Supp.
543, Peter C. Dorsey, J., held that liquor control provision
requiring out-of-state brewers and importers to certify that
prices charged Connecticut wholesalers were no higher than
lowest price at which item was sold to any wholesaler in
border states at time of posting did not violate commerce
clause. The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) realities of beer pricing in border states established that
Connecticut statute inevitably exercised control over prices
set for sales occurring wholly outside its territory and as such,
statute violated commerce clause, and (2) beer affirmation
provisions did not represent valid exercise of state's power
under Twenty-First Amendment.
Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes (4)

[1]

83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83k12 In General

Interaction of state statute with regulatory
schemes of neighboring states constitutes
“overall effect” which is appropriately
considered in determining whether statute
directly regulates interstate commerce in
violation of Federal Constitution. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

Allan S. Goodman, Inc.; and Hartley & Parker
Limited, Inc., Intervenors Defendants-Appellees.
No. 721, Docket 87-7880. | Argued
March 18, 1988. | Decided June 13, 1988.
Association of domestic brewers and importers of beer
brought suit seeking declaratory judgment that amended
beer price affirmation provisions of Connecticut Liquor
Control Act violated, inter alia, commerce clause of Federal

Commerce
Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon

Cases that cite this headnote
[2]

Commerce
Subjects and Regulations in General
83 Commerce
83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(F) Intoxicating Liquors
83k74.30 Subjects and Regulations in General
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Possibility that Alcohol Beverages Commission
might, in its discretion, grant deviation from
amended provisions of Connecticut Liquor
Control Act requiring “posting of prices” for
Connecticut wholesale sales in following month
and affirmation that such prices are no higher
than prices for wholesale sales in border states
on day of posting could not save statute
from determination of unconstitutionality under
commerce clause of Federal Constitution or shift
responsibility for its effects upon regulatory
bodies of other states. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §
8, cl. 3; C.G.S.A. § 30-63a(b).
3 Cases that cite this headnote
[3]

Commerce
Subjects and Regulations in General
Intoxicating Liquors
Licensing and Regulation
83 Commerce
83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(F) Intoxicating Liquors
83k74.30 Subjects and Regulations in General
223 Intoxicating Liquors
223II Constitutionality of Acts and Ordinances
223k15 Licensing and Regulation

Amended Connecticut Liquor Control Act
provision requiring out-of-state brewers and
importers to post prices to be charged
Connecticut wholesalers during following month
and requiring brewers and importers to affirm
that, on date of posting, such wholesale
price was as low as any charged in any
border state violated commerce clause of
Federal Constitution, notwithstanding fact that
statute did not explicitly prevent brewers from
changing prices in other states during calendar
month covered by posting, where by reason
of interaction of Connecticut provisions with
beer price regulations of bordering states,
Connecticut statute inevitably exercised control
over prices set for sales occurring wholly outside
Connecticut territory. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §
8, cl. 3; C.G.S.A. § 30-63a(b).

2 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

Intoxicating Liquors
Licensing and Regulation
223 Intoxicating Liquors
223II Constitutionality of Acts and Ordinances
223k15 Licensing and Regulation

Amended beer price affirmation provisions
of Connecticut Liquor Control Act requiring
out-of-state brewers and importers to post
wholesale prices for following month and to
affirm that prices were no higher than those
provided wholesalers in border states at time
of posting acted as direct regulation of beer
pricing in other states sufficient to dispose of
any issue as to whether statute represented
valid exercise of state's power under TwentyFirst Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 21;
C.G.S.A. § 30-63a(b).
2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*754 Jeffrey Glekel, New York City (Timothy G. Reynolds,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York City,
William H. Allen, Covington & Burling, Jerome I. Chapman,
Arnold & Porter, Gary Nateman, The Beer Institute,
Washington, D.C., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Robert F. Vacchelli, Asst. Conn. Atty. Gen., Newington,
Conn. (Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn. Atty. Gen., Richard M.
Sheridan, Asst. Conn. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for defendantsappellees.
William A. Wechsler, Hartford, Conn. (Alfred F. Wechsler,
Gregory J. Southworth, Bailey & Wechsler, Hartford, Conn.,
of counsel), for intervenors defendants-appellees.
Before TIMBERS, PRATT and MINER, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
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Plaintiffs-appellants The Beer Institute (formerly United
States Brewers Association), an industry association of beer
brewers and importers, et al., commenced an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Dorsey, J.) against defendants-appellees John F. Healy and
David L. Snyder, as Commissioners of the Connecticut
Department of Liquor Control, and Charles Kasmer, as
Secretary of the Department. The complaint asserted that the
amended beer price affirmation provisions of the Connecticut
Liquor Control Act, 1984 Conn.Acts 332, 432, and §
30-63a(b) of that Act violate the commerce clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the supremacy clause, id. art. VI, cl.
2. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent
enforcement of these provisions.
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court granted judgment for the defendants, holding that the
challenged provisions were constitutional. See United States
Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 669 F.Supp. 543 (D.Conn.1987).
Plaintiffs appeal from this judgment. Because we find that
the amended beer price affirmation provisions place an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, we reverse.

BACKGROUND
In United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275 (2d
Cir.1982) ( “Healy I ”), aff'd, 464 U.S. 909, 104 S.Ct. 265,
78 L.Ed.2d 248 (1983) (per curiam), we found that the
original beer price affirmation provisions of the Connecticut
Liquor Control Act placed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. The Act, now as then, requires “posting”
of prices, whereby *755 brewers and out-of-state beer
importers “file a schedule stating the per-unit price that [they]
will charge Connecticut wholesalers for [beer] products in
the following month,” id. at 276 (footnote omitted); see
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 30-63c (West 1975 & Supp.1988).
Posted prices become effective on the first day of the calendar
month following the posting. See Conn.Agencies Regs. §
30-6-B12(b). We noted that “[h]istorically the retail price
of beer has been generally higher in Connecticut than in its
neighboring states, i.e., Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode
Island,” 692 F.2d at 276.
To encourage Connecticut residents to buy beer in-state rather
than in the neighboring states, the legislature added beer

price affirmation provisions to the Act. These provisions
required that: (1) brewers adhere to the posted prices
during the one-month period for which they were posted,
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 30-63(c); (2) brewers file a sworn
affirmation that their posted per-unit prices would be no
higher than their prices in the border states for the same
period, id. § 30-63b(b); (3) Connecticut wholesalers be
charged per-unit prices by each brewer no higher than the
lowest wholesale price the brewer charges in any border
state, id. § 30-63a(b); (4) adjustments for rebates, discounts,
allowances and any other inducements offered to out-ofstate wholesalers be considered in calculating the “lowest”
price, id. § 30-63c(b); and (5) brewers offer to Connecticut
wholesalers all the sizes and packages of their brands offered
to border state wholesalers, id. Because there are no breweries
in Connecticut and all beer is shipped into Connecticut from
other states, only out-of-state brewers and importers are
affected by the Connecticut price affirmation law.
In striking down the price affirmation provisions as facially
invalid, this court observed that they told “a brewer that
for any given month when it sells beer to a wholesaler in
Massachusetts, New York, or Rhode Island, it may not do
so at a price lower than that it has previously announced it
will charge to Connecticut wholesalers,” Healy I, 692 F.2d
at 282. “Thus,” we concluded, “the obvious effect of the
Connecticut statute is to control the minimum price that may
be charged by a non-Connecticut brewer to a non-Connecticut
wholesaler in a sale outside of Connecticut,” id., in violation
of the commerce clause.
Thereafter, the Connecticut Legislature amended the
affirmation provisions with the stated purpose of remedying
the constitutional problem. Section 30-63b(b) was amended
to provide that the “lowest” price charged to border-state
wholesalers is determined “at the time of posting,” 1984
Conn.Acts 332 (“84-332”). 1 At the same time, section
30-63b(e) 2 was added, providing that § 30-63b did not
prohibit brewers from changing prices in other states “at any
time during the calendar month covered by such posting.”
However, § 30-63a(b), 3 which prevents brewers from *756
charging Connecticut wholesalers more than their lowest
border-state price during the posted period, was not amended.
Section 30-63c(b), which establishes how price will be
determined under the statute, also was amended by 84-332 to
refer to “price ... at the time of posting.” Another amendment
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applicable to § 30-63c(b) contained a conflicting description
of price. This amendment permits only differentials in
state taxes and actual delivery costs to be excluded from
the determination of “the lowest price” charged to any
border-state wholesaler “during such posted period,” 1984
Conn.Acts 432 (“84-432”) 4 (emphasis added), despite the
“time of posting” amendment made by 84-332.
1

As amended by 1984 Conn.Acts 332, § 30-63b(b)
provides:
At the time of posting of the bottle, can, keg or barrel
and case price required by section 30-63, every holder
of a manufacturer or out-of-state shipper's permit, or
the authorized representative of a manufacturer, shall
file with the department of liquor control a written
affirmation under oath by the manufacturer or out-ofstate shipper of each brand of beer posted certifying that,
at the time of posting, the bottle, can or case price, or
price per keg, barrel or fractional unit thereof, to the
wholesaler permittees is no higher than the lowest price
at which each such item of beer is sold, offered for sale,
shipped, transported or delivered by such manufacturer
or out-of-state shipper to any wholesaler in any state
bordering this state.

2

As added by 1984 Conn.Acts 332, § 30-63b(e) provides:
This section shall not prohibit a manufacturer or out-ofstate shipper permittee or the authorized representative of
a manufacturer from changing prices to any wholesaler
in any other state of the United States or in the District
of Columbia, or to any state or agency of a state which
owns and operates retail liquor outlets at any time during
the calendar month covered by such posting.

3

Section 30-63a(b) provides:
No holder of any manufacturer or out-of-state shipper's
permit shall ship, transport or deliver within this state, or
sell or offer for sale to a wholesaler permittee any brand
of beer as defined in section 30-1, at a bottle, can or case
price, or price per keg, barrel or fractional unit thereof,
higher than the lowest price at which such item is then
being sold or offered for sale or shipped, transported or
delivered by such manufacturer or out-of-state shipper to
any wholesaler in any state bordering this state.

4

1984 Conn.Acts 432 provides in pertinent part:
In determining the lowest price for which any item
of beer is or was sold, offered for sale, shipped,
transported or delivered during such posted period by any
manufacturer or out-of-state shipper to a wholesaler in

any state bordering this state, [only differentials in price
attributable to differences in state taxes and to delivery
costs are permissible].

Appellants commenced this action on July 25, 1984. In
their complaint appellants alleged that “ ‘the interaction of
the posting and affirmation provisions' ” of 84-332 and §
30-63a(b) “ ‘not only limits the price at which out-of-state
shippers may sell to Connecticut wholesalers, but also sets
the lowest price which an out-of-state shipper may charge
anywhere in the Border States during the succeeding month,’
” 669 F.Supp. at 547 (quoting Complaint at 14). “ ‘Thus,’
” they alleged, “ ‘as under the original price affirmation
scheme, an out-of-state shipper is not free to lower any Border
State price below the previously affirmed Connecticut price,’
” id. This, they claimed, violated not only the commerce
clause, but the supremacy clause as well, “by requiring outof-state shippers to establish and maintain minimum prices
for each item of beer in the four-state area and by precluding
them from dealing with any of their customers except on the
same or more favorable terms as they dealt with other of their
customers,” id.
The state recognized that § 30-63a(b) “ ‘standing alone’ ”
seemingly would prevent brewers from lowering the out-ofstate prices of products they also sold in Connecticut during
the entire month after posting. The state argued, however,
that 84-332 made it clear that the price affirmed as the
lowest price in the border states need only be effective at the
moment of posting: Brewers are free both before and after
posting to raise or lower their prices outside Connecticut.
(The posted Connecticut price remains in effect for the
following calendar month.) The state submitted a Declaration
and Ruling of the Connecticut Liquor Control Commission,
made pursuant to the Commission's discretionary authority
to “issue declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any
statutory provision or of any regulation or order of the
agency,” Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 4-176, providing, inter alia:
“[W]e must interpret [§ 30-63a(b) ]
in light of the obvious intention of
the Connecticut General Assembly....
Accordingly, we determine and declare
that C.G.S. § 30-63a(b) mandates only
that the brewer in a sale to a Connecticut
wholesaler not exceed its previously
posted price in Connecticut, but that
a sale at a price lower in a border
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state, during the calendar month covered
by such posting, does not contravene
this section.... To the extent ... that
C.G.S. § 30-63a(b) is inconsistent
with [Conn.Pub.Act 84-332], it must
be considered impliedly repealed since
the latest expression of the legislature
controls. Thus under the new affirmation
scheme an out-of-state shipper is free to
lower any border state price below the
previously affirmed Connecticut price.”

669 F.Supp. at 547 n. 9 (quoting Affidavit of the Liquor
Commission at 3-4). Thereafter, appellants withdrew their
supremacy clause claim. See id. at 548.
The district court observed that “[t]he ruling made clear
that, whatever the import *757 of § 30-63a(b), out-of-state
shippers need only affirm that at the time of posting in
Connecticut (and only at the time of posting), their prices
to Connecticut wholesalers are no higher than in the border
states,” id. at 547 (footnote omitted). Judge Dorsey found that
“[t]he 1984 amendments to Connecticut's beer affirmation
statute make the affirmation statute neither retrospective nor
prospective but, rather, contemporaneous,” id. at 551-52. 5
He therefore framed the issue as “whether Connecticut's
requirement that prices to its wholesalers be fixed by pricing
decisions in other states violates the commerce clause,” id. at
552. 6
5

A “retroactive” affirmation statute “require[s] prices
to an in-state wholesaler to be at the lowest price
at which the product was sold elsewhere during an
earlier time period.” Brown-Forman Corp. v. New
Mexico Dep't of Alco. Bev. Cont., 672 F.Supp. 1383,
1385 (D.N.M.1987). “Prospective” affirmation “uses as
its reference point the price for out-of-state sales of
liquor in the future.” Id. A “simultaneous” (also known
as “contemporaneous” or “concurrent”) affirmation
requires that “at the moment ” of posting or sale the
price to the in-state wholesaler “matches the lowest price
at which the product is being sold elsewhere.” See id.;
see also Note, Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 186,
190 n. 31 (1987) ( “Simultaneous statutes ... represent
a subdivision of the prospective category,” retaining

its “future-price orientation” but allowing “freedom to
change [out of state] prices after the schedule's effective
month has begun.”).

6

Several courts have found that simultaneous price
affirmation statutes directly regulate out-of-state liquor
prices in violation of the commerce clause. See BrownForman Corp. v. New Mexico Dep't of Alco. Bev. Cont.,
672 F.Supp. 1383 (D.N.M.1987); Brown-Forman Corp.
v. Tennessee Alco. Bev. Comm'n, No. 3-86-0926, slip
op. (M.D.Tenn. June 30, 1987); Brown-Forman Corp.
v. South Carolina Alco. Bev. Comm'n, 643 F.Supp. 943
(D.S.C.1986). The affirmation required by these statutes,
however, was not simultaneous with posting, but rather
with each sale: Brewers were required to affirm that “at
the moment of sale ” the price to the in-state wholesaler
“matches the lowest price at which the product is being
sold elsewhere,” Brown-Forman, 672 F.Supp. at 1385.
See Brown-Forman, slip op. at 2; Brown-Forman, 643
F.Supp. at 947.

Judge Dorsey had “little doubt that Connecticut's present
affirmation law would be constitutional under Seagram [v.
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 86 S.Ct. 1254, 16 L.Ed.2d 336 (1966)
],” id., which upheld a retrospective affirmation requirement
that the New York wholesale price was no higher than
the lowest price in any other state during the preceding
month. However, noting that Seagram had been questioned
by the Court in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90
L.Ed.2d 552 (1986), Judge Dorsey held that the affirmation
provisions nonetheless were constitutional, both on their
face and in their effect, because: (1) “unlike the version in
Healy I and Brown-Forman,” this statute “leaves brewers
free to raise or lower prices in the border states before and
after posting in Connecticut and does not, therefore, regulate
interstate commerce,” 669 F.Supp. at 553; (2) “Connecticut
is not seeking lower or better prices for its wholesalers
relative to out-of-state wholesalers, but simply equal prices,”
id.; and (3) the statute “operates even-handedly” and
legitimately reduces price discrimination against Connecticut
wholesalers, id. Holding the amended price affirmation
provisions constitutional, he stated, “comports with the
presumption of validity to which all economic regulatory
legislation is entitled” and “with the spirit of the twenty-first
amendment, which was intended to return broad control of
the liquor industry to the states,” id. at 552.
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On appeal, appellants, as they did in Healy I, “have launched
an all-out attack on the Connecticut beer price affirmation
provisions under the [c]ommerce [c]lause,” 692 F.2d at 281,
contending that the provisions are protectionist in purpose
and effect, are subverted by the Brown-Forman decision
because it has “significantly undermine[d]” the precedential
authority of Seagram, and operate to regulate beer prices
in the border states in violation of the commerce clause
and in excess of Connecticut's regulatory powers under
the twenty-first amendment. Because we agree that the
realities of beer price regulation in the *758 border state
area show that Connecticut's statute inevitably exercises
control over “the prices set for sales occurring wholly
outside its territory,” id. at 282, we do not reach the
issue of economic protectionism. Accordingly, we hold that
the amended Connecticut beer price affirmation provisions
directly regulate interstate commerce in violation of the
Constitution.

DISCUSSION
A. Commerce Clause
The commerce clause generally forbids “[s]tate regulation
that is designed to confer economic benefits on [its]
businesses and residents ... at the expense of businesses and
residents of other states,” Healy I, 692 F.2d at 279; see, e.g.,
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 350-53, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2445-46, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
However, “the fact that the law may not have been intended
as protectionist or discriminatory will not save it” when
the “effect of a state's law is to regulate conduct occurring
wholly outside the state,” Healy I, 692 F.2d at 279; see,
e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43, 102 S.Ct.
2629, 2640-41, 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982) (opinion of White,
J.); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775, 65
S.Ct. 1515, 1523, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945); Shafer v. Farmers'
Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199, 45 S.Ct. 481, 485, 69 L.Ed.
909 (1925). Thus, “[w]hen a state statute directly regulates
or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its
effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-ofstate interests,” it generally is invalidated “without further
inquiry,” Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. at 2084;
see, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
624, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978). When
a statute only indirectly affects interstate commerce and

regulates evenhandedly, the inquiry is “whether the [s]tate's
interest [in regulation] is legitimate and whether the burden
on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits,”
Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. at 2084; see Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847,
25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970).
[1] The Supreme Court has emphasized that whether the
regulation is direct or indirect, “the critical consideration is
the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate
activity,” Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. at 2084;
see Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,
440-41, 98 S.Ct. 787, 793-94, 54 L.Ed.2d 664 (1978), and
the interaction of the statute with the regulatory schemes
of neighboring states constitutes an “overall effect” which
appropriately is considered. See Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671, 101 S.Ct. 1309, 1316,
67 L.Ed.2d 580 (1981) (plurality) (Iowa law prohibiting
65-ft. double-trailer trucks “now out of step with the laws
of all other Midwestern and Western States”); Raymond
Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 445, 98 S.Ct. 796 (Wisconsin
double-truck length limitations prevented interline transfers
“from carriers that operate only in the 33 States where the
doubles are legal”); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520, 527-28, 79 S.Ct. 962, 966-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003
(1959) (interference with interline transfers by unique Illinois
mudguard law); Southern Pacific Co., 325 U.S. at 774-75, 65
S.Ct. at 1522-23 (1945) (Arizona train-length law effectively
“control[led] train operations beyond the boundaries of the
state” by requiring dismantling and reforming of interstate
trains at state line); see also Silver v. Woolf, 694 F.2d 8, 14
(2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 1525,
75 L.Ed.2d 948 (1983).
The district court found that the amended Connecticut
beer price affirmation provisions do not regulate interstate
commerce because they do not prohibit brewers from raising
or lowering beer prices in the border states prior to, or
following, the Connecticut posting. However, the court did
not examine whether in fact the interaction of the Connecticut
provisions with the beer price regulations of bordering states
would allow such pricing flexibility. Since Connecticut has
chosen to regulate beer prices in reference to the regulated
prices in the border states, it is particularly appropriate to
examine the effect of the Connecticut beer price affirmation
provisions resulting *759 from their interaction with the
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regulatory schemes of the border states. See Brown-Forman,
476 U.S. at 580, 583-84, 106 S.Ct. at 2086-87.
The Massachusetts beer pricing scheme requires brewers to
post prices by the first day of the month to become effective
on the first day of the following calendar month. These posted
prices cannot be changed by the brewer. See Mass.Ann.Laws
ch. 138, § 25B(d) (Law.Co-op.1981). As interpreted by the
Liquor Control Commission, the Connecticut law requires
brewers to affirm that the beer prices they post, at 10:00 a.m.
on the sixth day of each month, see Conn.Agencies Regs. §
30-6-B4a, are no higher than the prices that the brewer is then
charging in the border states.
Thus, for example, a brewer who posts his February
prices for Massachusetts on January 1 must look ahead
to the posting and affirmation of his March prices on
February 6 in Connecticut. The February prices that he
posts in Massachusetts on January 1 will be effective and
unchangeable at the time he must post and affirm his
Connecticut prices for March on February 6. Therefore, the
brewer cannot post a price in Massachusetts that is lower than
the price he plans to post over a month later in Connecticut.
In this way, a brewer posting his next-month's beer prices in
Massachusetts does so under the restriction of Connecticut's
affirmation law, which requires that the Connecticut price not
be “higher than the lowest price at which such item is then
being sold or offered for sale or shipped ... to any wholesaler”
in a border state, Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 30-63a(b). Moreover,
the price that the brewer posts in Massachusetts, as he
looks ahead to the Connecticut affirmation day, will be
effective not merely on that day, but for that entire month in
Massachusetts. A brewer can therefore undertake competitive
pricing based on the market realities of either Massachusetts
or Connecticut, but not both, because the Connecticut statute
ties pricing to the regulatory schemes of the border states.
In New York, a price that is decreased “per case, draft package
or special package of beer sold to beer wholesalers” cannot
be raised for at least 180 days. See N.Y.Alco.Bev.Cont.Law
§ 55-b(2) (McKinney 1987). A brewer who plans to decrease
his New York prices on a particular beer package, like the
brewer posting his prices in Massachusetts, is confronted with
the Connecticut posting and affirmation requirements. Once a
price decrease becomes effective in New York, that price will
control the price he may offer in Connecticut. On the sixth
day of each month in which the New York price reduction is

effective, the Connecticut statute will not allow the brewer to
charge a higher price in Connecticut for the following month,
no matter what the market realities would otherwise dictate.
Thus, a brewer could not raise his Connecticut price above the
New York level for a total of six calendar months, because the
Connecticut statute, in effect, makes the New York pricing
decision a decision for Connecticut as well. In addition, the
Connecticut affirmation day falling in the last month of the
New York price decrease would give Connecticut the benefit
of the decreased price for a calendar month beyond the date
that it terminates in New York. Clearly this restricts a brewer's
ability to promote a beer in New York that also is sold in
Connecticut. Moreover, a brewer who sells in both markets
would be severely hampered in his ability to respond to
market forces, particularly to the competitive demands of
the New York City market, the most competitive and lowest
priced market in the four-state region, see 669 F.Supp. at 546.
[2]
Both the Massachusetts and New York statutes
provide for administrative exemptions from the beer pricing
laws. See Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 138, § 25B(d) (exemption
only by “written permission of the [Alcoholic Beverages]
[C]ommission ... granted for good cause shown and for
reasons not inconsistent with the purpose of this chapter”);
N.Y.Alco.Bev.Cont.Law § 55-b(3)(c) ( “for good cause
shown to its satisfaction” Liquor Authority “may grant
waivers to licensees adversely affected by this section”).
However, the possibility *760 that an administrative agency
may in its discretion grant a deviation from regulatory
requirements cannot save the Connecticut statute or shift the
responsibility for its effects upon the regulatory bodies of
other states. As the Court observed in Brown-Forman, “[w]e
would not solve the constitutional problems inherent” in
Connecticut's amended affirmation provisions “by indulging
the ... assumption that the [Liquor] Authority will be sensitive
to [c]ommerce [c]lause concerns.... The protections afforded
by the [c]ommerce [c]lause cannot be made to depend on the
good grace of a state agency,” 476 U.S. at 582 n. 5, 106 S.Ct.
at 2086 n. 5.
[3]
Connecticut's affirmation provisions also regulate
beer prices in another way: restricting a brewer's ability
to offer volume discounts in the border states. While
volume discounting is unlawful in Connecticut, see
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 30-63(b), it is not generally prohibited
in the border states. Brewers complying with the Connecticut
affirmation statute must affirm that their prices for the
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entire state are no higher than any volume-discounted prices
offered in competitive border-state markets. The effect of the
Connecticut statute is to restrict a brewer's ability to offer
volume discounts in competitive markets of the border states
since the brewer could then not charge a higher price in the
less competitive Connecticut market. In this way, as well, the
Connecticut statute regulates pricing in other states.
Connecticut urges us to uphold the statute under Seagram.
However, Connecticut can find no solace in Seagram. We
observed in Healy I that “the holding in Seagram might well
validate beer price regulation less intrusive than the” former
Connecticut affirmation provisions, “such as a requirement
simply that a brewer set its Connecticut prices at the lowest
levels it chooses to set in the surrounding states,” 692 F.2d at
283-84. We did not thereby endorse regulation which had the
effect of controlling wholesale beer prices in other states. In
fact, we indicated that the validity of such an amended scheme
turned on its “leaving those out-of-state prices unregulated by
Connecticut,” id. at 284.
Moreover, the Court has cast doubt upon the continuing
validity of the principles underlying Seagram. The BrownForman majority did “not necessarily attach constitutional
significance to the difference between a prospective statute,”
such as the one it struck down, “and the retrospective statute
at issue in Seagram.” 476 U.S. at 584 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. at 2087 n.
6. The Court recognized that “one could argue that the effects
of the statute in Seagram do not differ markedly from the
effects of the statute at issue in the present case” but declined
to “consider the continuing validity of Seagram ” since
no retrospective statute was before the Court. Id. Writing
separately, Justice Blackmun would have overruled Seagram
as “a relic of the past” decided “when affirmation statutes
were comparatively new and long before the proliferation of
overlapping and potentially conflicting affirmation statutes,”
id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 2088 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
He saw “no principled distinction” between the two types
of statutes because both, “despite one's best efforts at
fine-tuning, operat[e] to affect out-of-state transactions and
violat[e] the [c]ommerce [c]lause,” id.; Note, Liquor Price
Affirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 86
Mich.L.Rev. 186, 188 (1987) (concluding “that all liquor
price affirmation statutes violate the commerce clause”).
We, of course, are not empowered to overrule Supreme Court
precedent. However, we clearly perceive that the basis of the

Seagram decision has been eroded and that the Court has
indicated strongly that Seagram may not survive the decision
in Brown-Forman. In fact, the Seagram court recognized that
it perhaps had not had the last word, observing that there
would be “time enough to assess the alleged extraterritorial
effects” of affirmation statutes “when a case arises that
clearly presents them,” 384 U.S. at 43, 86 S.Ct. at 1260.
This is such a case. Accordingly, we decline to extend the
Seagram precedent to validate a simultaneous affirmation
provision that, by its purposeful *761 interaction with
border-state regulatory schemes, operates to control prices
beyond Connecticut's borders.

B. Twenty-First Amendment
[4] Connecticut maintains that the beer price affirmation
provisions represent a valid exercise of its power under the
twenty-first amendment “to regulate, or prohibit entirely, the
transportation or importation of intoxicating liquor within
[its] borders,” 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335,
107 S.Ct. 720, 726, 93 L.Ed.2d 667 (1987). However, “[i]t
is well settled that the [t]wenty-first [a]mendment did not
entirely remove state regulation of alcohol from the reach of
the [c]ommerce [c]lause.” Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 584,
106 S.Ct. at 2087. The amendment reserves to states power
to regulate “ ‘transportation or importation ’ ” of liquor “
‘into any [s]tate ... for delivery or use therein,’ ” Healy I,
692 F.2d at 281 (emphasis added), but in no way “modifies
the traditional [c]ommerce [c]lause principles that bar a
state from regulating the transport, sale, or use of products
outside of its own territory,” id. Thus, our conclusion that the
Connecticut statute acts as a direct regulation of beer pricing
in other states sufficiently disposes of this issue. See BrownForman, 476 U.S. at 585, 106 S.Ct. at 2088. Moreover, the
extraterritorial effect of Connecticut's affirmation provisions,
particularly as to volume discounting, “may interfere with
the ability of other [s]tates to exercise their own authority
under the [t]wenty-first [a]mendment” by impinging upon
their “regulatory goals” or by “depriv[ing] their citizens of
the opportunity to purchase brands of liquor that are sold” in
Connecticut, id.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the amended
Connecticut beer price affirmation provisions directly
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regulate interstate commerce in violation of the commerce
clause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
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